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Barou

NanoCore is one of the most powerful RATs ever created. It is capable of taking complete control of a victim's machine. It allows a user to control the system with a Graphical User Interface (GUI). It has many features which allow a user to access remote computer as an administrator. Download nanocore rat 1.2.2.0 cracked version free of cost.

NanoCore's developer was arrested by FBI and pleaded guilty in 2017 for developing such a malicious privacy threat, and sentenced 33 months in prison.

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Recover Passwords from the Victim Device
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Plugins (To take it to the next level)
Many advanced features like SCRIPTING

DOWNLOAD NANOCORE RAT 1.2.2.0 CRACKED – REMOTE ADMINISTRATION TOOL

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Barou

Lets check different Cobalt Strike shellcodes and stages in the shellcodes emulator SCEMU.

This stages are fully emulated well and can get the IOC and the behavior of the shellcode.

But lets see another first stage big shellcode with c runtime embedded in a second stage.

In this case is loading tons of API using GetProcAddress at the beginning, then some encode/decode pointer and tls get/set values to store an address. And ends up crashing because is jumping an address that seems more code than address 0x9090f1eb.

Here there are two types of allocations:

Lets spawn a console on -c 3307548 and see if some of this allocations has the next stage.

The "m" command show all the memory maps but the "ma" show only the allocations done by the shellcode.

Dumping memory with "md" we see that there is data, and dissasembling this address with "d" we see the prolog of a function.

So we have second stage unpacked in alloc_e40064

With "mdd" we do a memory dump to disk we found the size in previous screenshot, and we can do some static reversing of stage2 in radare/ghidra/ida

In radare we can verify that the extracted is the next stage:

I usually do correlation between the emulation and ghidra, to understand the algorithms.

If wee look further we can realize that the emulator called a function on the stage2, we can see the change of code base address and is calling the allocated buffer in 0x4f...

And this stage2 perform several API calls let's check it in ghidra.

We can see in the emulator that enters in the IF block, and what are the (*DAT_...)() calls

Before a crash lets continue to the SEH pointer, in this case is the way, and the exception routine checks IsDebuggerPresent() which is not any debugger pressent for sure, so eax = 0;

So lets say yes and continue the emulation.

Both IsDebuggerPresent() and UnHandledExceptionFilter() can be used to detect a debugger, but the emulator return what has to return to not be detected.

Nevertheless the shellcode detects something and terminates the process.

Lets trace the branches to understand the logic:

target/release/scemu -f shellcodes/unsuported_cs.bin -vv | egrep '(\*\*|j|cmp|test)'

Continuing the emulation it's setting the SEH pointer to previous stage:

Lets see from the console where is pointing the SEH chain item:

to be continued ...

https://github.com/sha0coder/scemu

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Barou

Modern gcc compiler (v9.2.0) protects the stack by default and you will notice it because instead of SIGSEGV on stack overflow you will get a SIGABRT, but it also generates coredumps.

In this case the compiler adds the variable local_10. This variable helds a canary value that is checked at the end of the function.
The memset overflows the four bytes stack variable and modifies the canary value.

The 64bits canary 0x5429851ebaf95800 can't be predicted, but in specific situations is not re-generated and can be bruteforced or in other situations can be leaked from memory for example using a format string vulnerability or an arbitrary read wihout overflowing the stack.

If the canary doesn't match, the libc function __stack_chck_fail is called and terminates the prorgam with a SIGABORT which generates a coredump, in the case of archlinux managed by systemd and are stored on "/var/lib/systemd/coredump/"

❯❯❯ ./test
*** stack smashing detected ***: terminated
fish: './test' terminated by signal SIGABRT (Abort)

❯❯❯ sudo lz4 -d core.test.1000.c611b7caa58a4fa3bcf403e6eac95bb0.1121.1574354610000000.lz4
[sudo] password for xxxx:
Decoding file core.test.1000.c611b7caa58a4fa3bcf403e6eac95bb0.1121.1574354610000000
core.test.1000.c611b : decoded 249856 bytes

❯❯❯ sudo gdb /home/xxxx/test core.test.1000.c611b7caa58a4fa3bcf403e6eac95bb0.1121.1574354610000000 -q

We specify the binary and the core file as a gdb parameters. We can see only one LWP (light weight process) or linux thread, so in this case is quicker to check. First of all lets see the back trace, because in this case the execution don't terminate in the segfaulted return.

We can see on frame 5 the address were it would had returned to main if it wouldn't aborted.

Happy Idea: we can use this stack canary aborts to detect stack overflows. In Debian with prevous versions it will be exploitable depending on the compilation flags used.
And note that the canary is located as the last variable in the stack so the previous variables can be overwritten without problems.

Then in April 2021, Meta (formerly Facebook), which pointed out the group's affiliations to the cyber arm of Hamas, said it took steps to boot the adversary off its platform for distributing mobile malware against individuals associated with pro-Fatah groups, the Palestinian government organizations, military and security personnel, and student groups within Palestine.

Decoy document containing text on Palestinian reunification

The raft of new activity relies on the same tactics and document lures used by the group in 2017 and 2019, suggesting a "certain level of success" despite a lack of change in their tooling. More recent decoy files reference themes of Palestinian reunification and sustainable development in the territory that, when opened, lead to the installation of Micropsia on compromised machines.

The backdoor is designed to give the operators an unusual range of control over the infected devices, including the ability to harvest sensitive information and execute commands transmitted from a remote server, such as capturing screenshots, recording the current activity log, and downloading additional payloads.

"Arid Viper is a prime example of groups that aren't very advanced technologically, however, with specific motivations, are becoming more dangerous as they evolve over time and test their tools and procedures on their targets," researchers Asheer Malhotra and Vitor Ventura said.

"These [remote access trojans] can be used to establish long-term access into victim environments and additionally deploy more malware purposed for espionage and stealing information and credentials."

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vendredi 30 juin 2023

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lundi 5 juin 2023

DOWNLOAD NANOCORE RAT 1.2.2.0 CRACKED – REMOTE ADMINISTRATION TOOL

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DOWNLOAD NANOCORE RAT 1.2.2.0 CRACKED – REMOTE ADMINISTRATION TOOL

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Emulating Shellcodes - Chapter 2

Linux Stack Protection By Default

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dimanche 4 juin 2023

New Wave Of Cyber Attacks Target Palestine With Political Bait And Malware

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